Melvin Laws v. Blanding City : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Melvin Laws v. Blanding City : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary B. Ferguson; Williams & Hunt; Attorney for Appellee.
Darwin C. Fisher; Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation






BLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
li in' li i j y g 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MELVIN LAWS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No. 940415-CA 
BLANDING CITY, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : Argument Priority: 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ISSUE 1 6 
ISSUE 2 9 
ARGUMENT 13 
ISSUE 1 13 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXPERT WITNESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT 
PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 13 
A. PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF ECKOF, PROCTOR 
& WATSON AS ITS EXPERT WITNESS IS A 
PROPER DESIGNATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
TRIAL COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER 13 
B. AN EXPERT WITNESS MUST BE PREPARED WITH 
AN OPINION AS OF THE DATE OF 
DEPOSITION 16 
C. WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD ONLY BE UTILIZED 
AS A SANCTION FOR A WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE 
OF A COURT ORDER 17 
D. WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD NOT BE UTILIZED 
WHERE OTHER OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE 
COURT 20 
E. PLAINTIFF'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
WITNESS 22 
F. DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE WAS 
UNTIMELY 24 
G. DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY 
THE DESIGNATION OF MR. THORPE AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS 25 
ISSUE 2 29 
INTRODUCTION 2 9 
I. INSTRUCTION #17 WAS NOT THE PROPER 
INSTRUCTION 31 
A. INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT PROPER BASED ON 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS REVEALED BY THE 
EVIDENCE 31 
ii 
B. INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT THE CORRECT 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE 
JURISDICTION 33 
C. INSTRUCTION #17 APPLIES THE OPEN AND 
OBVIOUS DANGER RULE, WHICH IS 
INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS STATE 37 
D. AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343 OF THE 
RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS IS ONLY 
PROPER WHEN GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN 
INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343A 42 
II. PROPER INSTRUCTION MUST BE FOUNDED ON 
TRADITIONAL PREMISES LIABILITY PRINCIPLES. . . 45 
A. DEFENDANT HAS DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF 
FROM UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON 
PREMISES 45 
B. THE JURY INSTRUCTION MUST CORRECTLY STATE 
DEFENDANT'S DUTY WITHOUT ABROGATING THIS 
STATE'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM. . 4 6 
CONCLUSION 50 
APPENDIX 1 53 
APPENDIX 2 54 
APPENDIX 3 55 
APPENDIX 4 56 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited: 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 r. ;:rl 175 (Utah 1975) . . 48 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992) . . 1, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 29 
Canfield v. Albertsons, o-i ; P.2d 1224, 200 Utah Adv Kep. 
(Ct.App. 1991) . 
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P..id llbU, (Utah Ct.App. 
1987) " : 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. b4 
(Ct.App.1989) 34, 35, 37-40 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) 1,1 
Ellertson V. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978) 37 
English v. Kienke, 848 l..:u IL.J (wt ,-ui 199;| . . . i«, 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. et al., 232 P. 2d 210. 1 •..-.. _>1 
(1951) 40, 49 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 754 
P.2d 89 (Ct.App.1988) 30, 45-48 
Hampton v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d 151 
(1960) 40 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct.App. 
1992) 28 
In re Disciplinary Action of George McCune. 717 P. 2d 701 (Utah 
1986) 24 
Inner City Wrecking Co. v. Bilskv, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ohio App. 
1983) 18, 22 
Jacobson Constr. Co. V. Strutco-Lite Eng'g, Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 309 
(Utah 1980) 39 
Jansen v. Lichwa, 474 P.2d 1020 (Ariz.App. 1970) 28 
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955) 
40 
Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973) . . . 40 
iv 
Martin v. Safewav Stores. Inc. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 
1977) 40,47 
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. . 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 
1981) 38 
Nickev v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio App. 1982) 17 
Ohlson v. Safewav Stores, Inc.. 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) 40, 50 
Parker V. Highland Park, Inc.. 565 S.W.2d 512, (Tex. 1978) . 39, 
49 
Plonkey v. Superior, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970) 22 
Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co.. 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991) 45 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, Inc., 491 P.2d 1209, 26 Utah 
2d 448 (1971) 23 
Schultz v. Ouintana. 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978) 29,33 
Sexton v. Sugar Creek Packing Co.. 311 N.E.2d 535,538 (Ohio 
1973) 20 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc., 
814 P.2d 623 (Ut.Ct.App.1991)40 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342 (1993) . 1 
Stephenson v. Warner et. al.. 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978) . 30, 40 
Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, (Utah 1979) 46 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, (Utah 
1990) 18 
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) 40 
Statutes Cited: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3) (j) (as amended 1953) 1 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (as amended 1953) 1 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994) 2, 34 
Rules Cited: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (1994) 1, 21 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 30 (1994) 1, 7, 14-16 
v 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) (as amended 1953). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (as amended 1953). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in excluding the testimony of 
Plaintiff's expert witness? 
This is a case management decision, and is therefore under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Berrett v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western R.R, Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(Ct.App.1992). Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
B. Did the trial court correctly state the law concerning 
negligence in instructing the jury? 
Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed on a 
"correctness" standard. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 
862 P.2d 1342 (1993) . 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules whose interpretation is 
pertinent to this appeal are as follows: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 0 (1994). See appendix 1 
attached. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (1994). See appendix 2 
attached. 
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Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994). See appendix 3 
attached. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a civil case, which was commenced in March of 1991 
to recover damages sustained by Plaintiff Melvin Laws, who was 
injured in a fall from a dumping platform at the Blanding City 
Dump. Plaintiff alleges that the injuries were caused by the 
negligence of Blanding City in the construction and maintenance 
of the dump, and the lack of safety equipment. (Rec. at 1-7). 
jury demand was filed in November, 1994. (R. at 10). 
In January of 1994, one month prior to trial, Defendant 
filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's expert witness. (R. at 364 
65). The motion was granted. (R. at 413-16). Plaintiff filed 
motion for a new trial which was denied. (R. at 453-54). 
The case was tried to a jury in February 1994. Exception 
was taken by Plaintiff with the trial court's list of jury 
instructions. (Trial Transcript [Tr.] at 230-31). The trial 
court overruled Plaintiff's objection. (Tr. at 231). The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, finding no negligence 
on the part of Defendant. (Tr. at 269-73). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Melvin Laws lives at 1050 N. 850 W. in 
Blanding, Utah. (Tr. at 11) . 
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2. On April 28, 1990, Plaintiff went to the Blanding City 
Dump to dispose of garbage. (Tr. at 14-15). 
3. While at the dump, Plaintiff fell down a 30-40 foot 
precipice into the dump. (Tr. at 21). 
4. On the day of the accident, strong winds whipped 
through the canyon, and smoke from several small fires in the 
dump clouded the sky. (Tr. at 132-33). 
5. The dump had recently been bulldozed by the Defendant, 
creating a 30-40 foot precipice. (Tr. at 141-42). 
6. A city ordinance requires city residents to subscribe 
to a garbage retrieval service. (Tr. at 151-152). 
7. The city of Blanding does not provide garbage retrieval 
for citizens living within the county but outside city limits. 
(Tr. at 151-152) . 
8. A special arrangement must be made with a private 
contractor for a resident outside city limits to receive garbage 
retrieval service. (Tr. at 152). 
9. Without a special arrangement, the only location 
provided for citizens, who live outside city limits, to dispose 
of garbage is the dump where the injury occurred. (Tr. at 151-
152) . 
10. Blanding citizens are not allowed to dispose of garbage 
at any other location. (Tr. at 151-152). 
11. Blanding citizens are not allowed to leave the garbage 
along the edge of the precipice, but are required to throw the 
garbage over the edge. (Tr. at 137). 
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12. A wall, 10-18" in height, separates a person and the 
edge of the cliff over which the garbage is thrown. (Tr. at 21, 
151) . 
13. Before the date of Plaintiff's injury, Defendant was 
aware that others have been injured at the dump. (Tr. at 139). 
14. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Blanding City in 
1991. 
15. On June 14, 1993, the trial court entered a scheduling 
order establishing a deadline for the designation of expert 
witnesses on August 15, 1993, as well as a deadline for the 
filing of discovery of October 3, 1993. (R. at 288-89). 
16. This Court subsequently modified its scheduling order 
by extending the witness designation date to September 30, 1993, 
and the discovery cutoff to December 10, 1993. (R. at 358-59). 
17. On or about September 30, 1993, Plaintiff filed his 
designation of witnesses in compliance with the court's 
scheduling order. (R. at 302-04). 
18. Witness #14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses designates 
"Eckoff, Proctor & Watson", an engineering firm in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. (R. at 302-04). 
19. Due to a clerical error, the correct name of Eckoff, 
Proctor & Watson is Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. 
20. Defendant was informed of the name of the individual 
who would testify for Eckhoff, Watson & Preator during the last 
week of November. (R. at 465) . 
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21. In a letter dated December 6, 1993, Plaintiff affirmed 
Mr. Thorpe's cooperation. (R. at 413-14). 
22. Plaintiff told Defendant that Mr. Thorpe still had to 
review materials and therefore had not yet formed an opinion. 
(R. at 414). 
23. Plaintiff informed Defendant that he could depose the 
expert at any time, regardless of the discovery deadline. (R. at 
465) . 
24. Defendant finally filed a motion in limine with the 
court on January 7, 1994, requesting exclusion of the witness. 
(R. at 364). 
25. The trial court granted the motion excluding the 
witness on February 2, 1994. (R. at 413-16). 
26. The trial court's grounds for excluding the witness 
were that the Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert 
witness until he provide the name of the individual. (R. at 
414) . 
27. Plaintiff's expert testimony would have established the 
safety precautions that should have been instituted at the dump 
and would have evaluated the design, construction, and 
maintenance of the dump under the circumstances of this case. 
(R. at 361). 
28. Prior to trial, both Defendant and Plaintiff filed with 
the trial court requested jury instructions. (R. at 423-24, 432-
52) . 
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29. The court determined the jury instructions to be used 
for trial. (R. at 504-32). 
30. Plaintiff objected to instruction #17 prior to 
submitting them to the jury on the grounds that they were not 
indicative of the law. (Tr. at 230) . 
31. Plaintiff proposed that instructions #17-19 from 
Plaintiff's requested jury instructions be used. (Tr. at 230). 
32. The court overruled Plaintiff's objection. (Tr. at 
231) . 
33. Instruction #17 as given to the jury, confused the jury 
as to apportioning fault. (Tr. at 269-70). 
34. The jury wanted to apportion fault to both parties, 
however the instruction did not allow it. (Tr. at 269-73) . 
35. The jury found that Defendant was 0% negligent. (Tr. 
at 273) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
A scheduling order required the parties to exchange witness 
lists on September 30, 1993. (R. at 358). The trial court 
sanctioned Plaintiff on the grounds that he failed to comply with 
this order. (R. at 413). The trial court excluded Plaintiff's 
expert witness. (R. at 413-15). Contrary to the court's ruling, 
Plaintiff's designation of witness #14 was not in violation of 
the scheduling order of the court, nor did it prejudice the 
Defendant in the preparation of his case. 
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Plaintiff designated Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as witness 
#14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses. (R. at 302). This 
designation complied with the trial court's order. (R. at 3 58-
59) . 
Rule 30(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
party to notice the deposition of a corporation without the name 
of the specific individual. When the name is unknown, it is 
sufficient to provide a brief description of the matter on which 
deposition is sought. The Corporation or organization must 
designate a person to testify at deposition. The selected 
individual must formulate an opinion as of the date of the 
deposition. If an expert is not noticed for deposition, he is 
unconstrained from forming or changing his opinion up to the time 
of trial. 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator had not yet designated its expert 
as of September 30, 1993. (R. at 465). Still, it should be 
remembered that the Defendant could have deposed the witness at 
any time after September 30, 1993, as provided in Rule 3 0 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant chose not to. Instead, 
Defendant waited until January 1994, when he filed a Motion in 
Limine to exclude the witness. 
The trial court did not expressly require that the name of 
the individual be designated. The order only required a list of 
witnesses, obviously, to enable each party to depose the 
witnesses in preparation for trial. Plaintiff did not violate 
the order. 
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Plaintiff's designation of witness #14 did not prejudice 
Defendant in the preparation of its case. Defendant could have 
noticed the firm's deposition at any time. (R. at 465). 
Plaintiff informed Defendant on November 23, 1993, that Gregory 
Thorpe would be the representative of the firm at the time of 
trial. (R. at 465). This was not a designation of a new 
witness. Plaintiff merely identified the individual who would 
speak on behalf of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. Defendant was 
always aware that the expert witness would be provided by 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. Defendant therefore, was not 
prevented from preparing its case. 
Witness exclusion should only be used to sanction a party 
for willful noncompliance with a court order. Other methods are 
available when witness exclusion is not warranted. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disregard 
the court's scheduling order. Plaintiff simply did not 
understand the court's unexpressed expectations. Inasmuch as the 
Plaintiff did not violate any court order compelling him to 
provide the name of the expert, and inasmuch as the Defendant 
could have discovered the name at any time by noticing the 
deposition of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the court to exclude Plaintiff's expert testimony. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did violate the order, 
the court could have issued other sanctions. A motion to compel, 
on the court's own initiative, or on motion by Defendant, would 
have sufficiently notified Plaintiff of his error. Plaintiff 
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could then have complied with the court's expectations before it 
was excessively late in the discovery process. An order to 
exclude the witness, would not have been necessary. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff violated the scheduling 
order, Defendant failed to timely object. Following Defendant's 
receipt of Plaintiff's witness list, Defendant should have moved 
to compel the Plaintiff. Defendant did not. Instead, Defendant 
told Plaintiff to apprise Defendant as soon as possible of the 
designated representative of the firm. (R. at 413). Plaintiff 
advised Defendant of Mr. Thorpe at the end of November. (R. at 
465). Defendant still did not object. Instead Defendant waited 
until January to file a motion to exclude the witness. Assuming, 
arguendo, Defendant had a right to object, Defendant was untimely 
and therefore should be held to have waived its right. 
Plaintiff's case was sufficiently prejudiced by the court's 
exclusion of his expert witness. The expert testimony went 
directly to the issues on which the jury would base its decision. 
The expert would testify regarding design, construction, 
maintenance, and safety measures. (R. at 361). These are all 
important factors in determining whether Defendant had a duty and 
breached it. The court's exclusion, therefore, deprived 
Plaintiff of his right to present his entire case to a jury. 
ISSUE 2 
Jury instructions must instruct the jury as to the law of 
the jurisdiction and be appropriate given the facts of the case. 
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Instruction #17, (See Appendix 4) in the case at bar, failed 
to correctly instruct the jury as to the appropriate law of the 
jurisdiction given the facts of the case. 
Instruction #17 reads as follows: 
the defendant is negligent if, but only if, he (a) knows or 
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the 
condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or 
will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails 
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the 
danger. 
(Tr. at 238-39). 
The instruction is based partly on the Restatement Second of 
Torts, §343 as it was applied in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 
(Utah 1993). The direct application of the undisputed facts, as 
they appeared in English, to Section 343, as it is written, was 
appropriate only because the case was decided on summary 
judgment. A direct application, as done in English, is 
inappropriate as an instruction to a jury which has the duty to 
weigh the evidence and apply principles of comparative negligence 
to the facts. 
Instruction #17 substituted principles of comparative 
negligence with principles of contributory negligence. 
Instruction #17 calls for the harsh result of total victory or 
complete defeat. Such an outcome is characteristic of a 
contributory negligence system, which this state has abolished 
when it adopted comparative negligence. 
Instruction #17 applies the open and obvious danger rule, 
which this state has also abolished. The rule requires the jury 
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to reach an all or nothing conclusion, as in a contributory 
negligence system. First, if the danger was open and obvious and 
Plaintiff unreasonably encountered it, Defendant is not at fault. 
Second, if the danger was not open and obvious and Plaintiff 
encountered it, Defendant is entirely at fault. 
Comment (a) of the Reporter's Notes to Section 343 of the 
Restatement Second of Torts states: 
this section should be read together with §343A, which deals 
with the effect of the fact that the condition is known to 
the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact that 
the invitee is a patron of a public utility. 
Assuming, arguendo, that instruction #17 was correct, the court 
should have also given an instruction similar to Section 343A 
which would clarify the intent of the open and obvious nature of 
the dump. Section 343A also clarifies the duty which a 
landowner, that is a government agency, has to an invitee. 
The misleading effect of Instruction #17 is clearly shown in 
the record. To the court, the jury expressed its desire to 
apportion fault to both parties and award damages to plaintiff 
but was confused at how to do that given the instructions it had. 
The judge instructed them to look to the instructions and special 
verdict form for an answer. However, the instructions and 
special verdict form did not allow the jury to act as they 
desired. 
Any case dealing with injury to visitors upon land must be 
based upon principles of premises liability. In the state of 
Utah, the injured visitor is classified as either an Invitee, 
Licensee, or Trespasser. In the case at bar, the Plaintiff is 
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properly classified as an invitee. The duty that a landowner 
owes to an invitee is the duty to discover unreasonably dangerous 
conditions and remedy them or warn the visitor of them. This 
applies to landowners who have reason to believe that the invitee 
will proceed to encounter a danger despite the danger's obvious 
nature. Instruction #17 did not properly instruct the jury 
regarding the foregoing principles. 
The instruction regarding Defendant's duty should have 
contained two elements. First, whether the defendant knew, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed. Second, whether sufficient time elapsed 
thereafter tha action could have been taken to correct the 
situation. A separate instruction should have addressed 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The instruction given to a jury in a premises liability case 
should allow the jury to properly apply principles of comparative 
negligence. The Plaintiff has a right to have his fault compared 
to the fault attributable to Defendant. Plaintiff's requested 
instructions properly allowed the jury to perform its 
responsibility. 
The use of instruction #17, in the case at bar, 
substantially prejudiced the Plaintiff's case by taking from the 
Plaintiff the right to have his fault compared to the fault 
attributable to the Defendant. The instruction caused the jury 
to revert back to principles of contributory negligence finding 
that if the Plaintiff was also negligent, recovery is barred. 
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The instruction sufficiently misled the jury as to the 
appropriate law applicable to premises liability. Had the proper 
instruction been given, a fair comparison of fault would have 
been made to make a proper determination of liability. Plaintiff 
would have recovered. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OP PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded 
Plaintiff's expert witness from testifying at trial. The court's 
exclusion prejudiced Plaintiff's case. The expert testimony 
would have went directly to the issues on which the jury would 
base its decision. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF ECKOF, PROCTOR & WATSON AS 
ITS EXPERT WITNESS IS A PROPER DESIGNATION IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER. 
In the case at bar, a scheduling order required Plaintiff to 
provide a witness list by September 30, 1993. (R. at 358). 
Plaintiff complied with the court's order. (R. at 302-04). 
Witness #14 on Plaintiff's Witness list was "Eckof, Proctor 
& Watson," an engineering firm in Salt Lake City. (R. at 302). 
This engineering firm would provide Plaintiff's expert witness at 
trial. Due to a clerical error the correct name of the 
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engineering firm is Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. Plaintiff made 
the error known to Defendant as soon as it was discovered. 
The court excluded Plaintiff's expert witness. The grounds 
for excluding the witness was that "Plaintiff did not properly 
designate his expert witness until he provided the name of an 
individual." (R. at 414). The court's reasoning for this was 
that: "it is unreasonable to expect a party to examine every 
member of a firm in order to make sure that the eventual witness 
has been deposed." (R. at 415). 
Rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
"after the commencement of the action, any party may take the 
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon 
oral examination." The rule requires that: 
a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon 
oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to 
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the 
time and place for taking the deposition and the name and 
address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the 
name is not known, a general description sufficient to 
identify him or the particular class or group to which he 
belongs. 
U.R.C.P. 30(b)(1) (1994). 
In a notice of deposition, when the name of the witness is 
unknown, it is sufficient to give a description that will 
identify the witness or the particular class or group to which 
the witness would belong. 
When dealing with the deposition of an organization or 
corporation, it is sufficient to simply name the organization and 
describe with reasonable particularity the matter on which 
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examination is requested. Subsection (6) of Rule 30(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that: 
a party may in his notice and subpoena name as the deponent 
a public or private corporation, a partnership, an 
association, or a governmental agency and describe with 
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is 
requested. In that event, the organization so named shall 
designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, 
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf and 
may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on 
which he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty 
organization of its duty to make such a designation. The 
persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or 
reasonably available to the organization. 
To notice the deposition of an organization it is therefore, not 
necessary that the name of the individual who will represent the 
organization at the time of deposition be known. When the 
organization is a nonparty, a subpoena shall advise it of its 
duty to make a designation of the individual who will testify on 
its behalf. 
The extension of this rule then, as it applies to the 
designation of witnesses who are corporations or organizations, 
is that a good faith, proper designation of a prospective witness 
to opposing counsel must provide the name of the corporation or, 
if known, the name of the person assigned to represent the firm. 
Obviously, if the person to represent the firm is not yet 
designated, it is the firm's responsibility to appoint an 
individual prior to the date of deposition. The fact that the 
individual selected to testify is not designated does not relieve 
Defendant from the obligation of noticing the deposition of 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. 
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In the case at bar, Plaintiff properly designated Witness 
#14 as Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. (R. at 302) . The individual 
who would testify for the firm was not yet designated, and 
therefore not named specifically. The defendant was not 
prejudiced by the lack of the specific name of the individual 
because Rule 3 0 permits the Defendant to: 
name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a 
partnership, an association, or a governmental agency and 
describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which 
examination is requested. 
The Defendant was not precluded from noticing Eckhoff, Watson & 
Preator for deposition at any time after September 30, 1993. 
Defendant chose not to. Plaintiff should not be sanctioned for 
Defendant's lack of diligence. 
B. AN EXPERT WITNESS MUST BE PREPARED WITH AN OPINION AS 
OF THE DATE OF DEPOSITION. 
The trial court stated, in its Ruling on Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's Designation of Expert Witness, that: 
the expert must, at the very least, be prepared with an 
opinion within a reasonable time before discovery ends. 
(R. at 415). 
Clearly, in coming to this conclusion, the court assumes that the 
witness will be deposed by opposing counsel. However, it is not 
always the case that an opinion be formed before discovery ends. 
If the opposing party decides not to depose the witness, the 
expert is not prevented from forming or changing his opinion up 
to the time of his testimony at trial. The correct assumption 
would be that the expert witness must form an opinion prior to 
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the recording of his expert testimony, whether that means by 
deposition or at trial, for the witness will be held to his 
opinion as of that date. 
In the case at bar, clearly it would have been in the 
Defendant's best interest to depose the expert immediately. Rule 
30(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the 
correct procedure for doing so when dealing with an organization 
such as Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. Defendant could have limited 
the opinion of the expert to that at the time of deposition. 
Defendant chose not to. 
Plaintiff should not be penalized for Defendants failure to 
act. If the delay by Defendant's counsel was to allow Plaintiff 
sufficient time to prepare, Defendant's counsel should have taken 
the deposition of the expert when the expert was prepared. If 
the delay by Defendant's counsel was to lead Plaintiff along 
until discovery cutoff and then move to exclude the witness, 
Defendant's counsel acted in bad faith and should not be rewarded 
for it. Neither reason warrants the court's sanction, which it 
issued against Plaintiff. 
C. WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD ONLY BE UTILIZED AS A SANCTION 
FOR A WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE OF A COURT ORDER. 
In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 
P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), the court quoted 
Nickey v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio App. 1982) stating that: 
[witness] exclusion is a severe sanction which should be 
invoked only to enforce willful noncompliance. 
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In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disobey the 
court's scheduling order. 
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 
(Utah 1990), the plaintiff objected to Defendant's use of certain 
films on the grounds that the films were withheld by Defendants 
in violation of the court's discovery order. The trial court 
sustained the objection. The Supreme Court held, however, that 
it was improper to sanction the defendant for not producing the 
test films during discovery because they did not fall within the 
express terms of the order. 
The significance of the foregoing is that a sanction should 
only be issued when a party willfully disregards the express 
provisions of an order. In Berrett, the trial court held a 
hearing in which it "had an unexpressed expectation that the pre-
trial order would contain the final witness list". Berrett v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992). When plaintiff failed to comply, the 
court sanctioned him by excluding an expert witness. However, 
this Court reversed the decision holding that: 
absent an order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a 
trial court may not sanction a party by excluding its 
witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992). See also Inner City 
Wrecking Co. v. Bilskv, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ohio App. 1983) . 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff complied with the Court's 
scheduling order when it listed Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as 
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Witness #14. The scheduling order required simply that a final 
list of witnesses be provided. The list was to enable each party 
to begin to depose the witnesses. It wasn't until the Court's 
memorandum Ruling on the Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation 
of Expert Witness, that the court stated that: "Plaintiff did 
not properly designate his expert witness until he provided the 
name of an individual." (R. at 414). 
Just as the court in Berrett had an unexpressed expectation 
as to what it meant in its hearing, the trial court, in the case 
at bar, had an unexpressed interpretation of what it meant when 
it ordered that witness lists be exchanged by September 30, 1993. 
Plaintiff did not attempt to be devious, nor did Plaintiff 
attempt to act in bad faith. Plaintiff complied with the express 
demands of the order in the manner he understood to be proper. 
In Dugan v, Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (1980), the trial court 
ordered the parties to exchange witness lists at least 15 days 
before trial. The order was never written down. The trial court 
subsequently excluded defendants' experts from testifying for 
violation of the order. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
decision. It held that even though there is no statutory 
requirement for reducing orders to writing it should be 
encouraged. "Written pretrial orders reduce the chances for 
confusion or memory lapses as to what actually was the agreement 
at the conference." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, (1980). 
Similar to Dugan, in the case at bar, the court's failure to 
expressly require what it expected caused confusion and 
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ultimately prejudiced the Plaintiff's case. It was improper to 
sanction the Plaintiff for not complying with the court's 
unexpressed expectations. 
Had Plaintiff been in violation of the court's unexpressed 
expectation as to the scheduling order for the designation of 
witnesses, Defendant should have filed a motion to compel the 
Plaintiff to disclose the name of the expert witness in the 
proper form. This would have expressly notified Plaintiff that 
the court required Plaintiff to identify the names of each 
witness. If Plaintiff failed to comply, he would be willfully 
disregarding a court order. The court could then, properly 
sanction the Plaintiff by excluding his expert witness. 
D. WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD NOT BE UTILIZED WHERE OTHER 
OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE COURT. 
The court in Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. 
Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), quoting 
Sexton v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 311 N.E.2d 535,538 (Ohio 
1973), stated: 
the necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a sanction 
is an order that 'brings the offender squarely within 
possible contempt of court.' 
Absent an order a party may believe that the court has no 
objection to the information as supplied. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disregard the 
court's order. In fact, Plaintiff believed that its witness list 
was in accordance with the court's expectations. The lack of a 
motion to compel by Defendant confirmed Plaintiff's belief. 
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The court, on its own initiative, could have issued an order 
compelling Plaintiff to properly comply with the order long 
before an exclusion order would be necessary. Rule 16(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling 
or pretrial order...the court, upon motion or its own 
initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are 
just. 
U.R.C.P. 16(d) (1994). 
Justice demands that if Plaintiff had failed to comply with the 
scheduling order, the court should have issued an order to compel 
the Plaintiff to do so. It was an abuse of the court's 
discretion to forego a motion to compel and proceed directly to 
an exclusion of the witness. 
In Dugan v. Jones the Supreme Court held that: 
the court could have used means other than exclusion to 
sanction defendant's for their noncompliance with the order, 
including imposing costs incurred by the other parties in 
obtaining experts. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (1980). 
In the case at bar, rather than excluding Plaintiff's expert in 
February, the court, on its own initiative, could have issued an 
order compelling Plaintiff to properly comply with the witness 
designation soon after its filing in September. The court could 
also have imposed costs on Plaintiff which Defendant would incur 
in having to expedite the deposition taking and transcribing. 
The court's sanction was excessive for the error allegedly 
committed. 
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The court in Inner City Wrecking Co. v. Bilsky, 3 67 N.E.2d 
1214, 1218 (Ohio 1983) held: 
without an order compelling compliance with court rules, the 
sanction imposed by the trial court was beyond its 
authority. 
In the case at bar, a motion to compel should have been made by 
Defendant in a timely manner for two reasons. First, a motion to 
compel would have properly notified Plaintiff of his error and 
provided an opportunity to correct it. Second, a motion would 
have prevented the needless expense of preparing the expert 
witness for trial. Instead, Defendant and the court allowed 
Plaintiff to proceed on the presumption that he was not in 
violation of the order. 
E. PLAINTIFF'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE EXCLUSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS. 
Courts have broad discretion in managing cases that are 
before them. However, when a court's management amounts to an 
abuse of discretion the court has exceeded its authority. 
In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 
P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), quoting Plonkev v. 
Superior, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970), this Court held that: 
Excluding a witness from testifying is, however, "extreme in 
nature and...should be employed only with caution and 
restraint." 
It is not sufficient for reversal that the court merely made 
an error in its case management decision. 
The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse for mere 
error or irregularity. We do so only if the complaining 
party has been deprived of a fair trial. The test to be 
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applied is: Was there error or irregularity such that there 
is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in its absence 
there would have been a result more favorable to him? 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, Inc., 491 P.2d 1209, 26 Utah 
2d 448 (1971). 
This is a difficult evaluation. In Berrett, this court 
determined that: 
If we cannot, with any degree of assurance, affirm that the 
use of such evidence would not have been helpful to the 
plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing 
him to have a full and fair presentation of his cause to the 
jury. 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992). 
In the case at bar, the court's exclusion of Plaintiff's 
expert witness sufficiently prejudiced Plaintiff's case. 
Plaintiff's expert testimony went directly to the issues that the 
jury had to decide. The expert testimony would have established 
the safety precautions that should have been instituted at the 
dump under the circumstances of this case. (R. at 361). The 
expert testimony would have gone to the design, construction, and 
maintenance of the dump. (R. at 3 61). The testimony would have 
gone to the duty of Defendant to maintain the dump in a 
reasonably safe condition. (R. at 361). 
A significant indication of the importance of Plaintiff's 
expert testimony is demonstrated by the actions of Defendant's 
counsel. The very fact that counsel for the Defendant moved to 
exclude the testimony at trial indicates that he thought the 
matter was of sufficient consequence. 
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The trial court held that circumstances at a dump are known 
to everyone and therefore an expert witness is not essential. (R. 
at 415). Plaintiff disagrees. An expert is necessary to 
establish duty. Plaintiff's expert was necessary to educate the 
jury as to the proper actions that should have been taken by the 
Defendant with respect to the Plaintiff. To exclude such 
testimony, sufficiently infringes on the rights of the Plaintiff 
to present his case in full to a jury of his peers. The court 
abused its discretion given it under the rules, and prejudiced 
the Plaintiff's case in the process. 
F. DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE WAS UNTIMELY. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's designation of Witness 
#14 was insufficient, Defendant should have objected within a 
reasonable time after the service of Plaintiff's Witness List. 
In In re Disciplinary Action of George McCune, 717 P.2d 701 
(Utah 1986), the court held: 
Counsel waived his right to object to the failure to add 
three days to the five-day notice period when notice of his 
two disciplinary hearings was mailed to him, since he did 
not object at the time of either hearing to the notice he 
received, and he showed no prejudice resulting from the 
shortened time period. 
Although this case dealt with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure regarding service, the principles are applicable to the 
case at bar. Defendant's objection must be timely and must show 
prejudice to Defendant's case. 
Upon receipt of Plaintiff's Witness List, Defendant was 
notified of Plaintiff's expert witness designation. Defendant 
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should have objected, within a reasonable time, to Plaintiff's 
designation of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, as witness #14, if it 
was insufficient. Defendant, however, did not. 
Plaintiff informed Defendant that the name of the expert was 
not known as of September 30, 1993, but would be designated soon 
by Eckhoff, Watson & Preator. Defendant did not object. 
Instead, Defendant told Plaintiff to contact him when Plaintiff 
was apprised of the expert's name. 
Defendant was informed, by phone, of the expert's name on 
November 23, 1993, at least two weeks before discovery cutoff. 
(R. at 465). In a letter dated December 6, 1993, Plaintiff 
affirmed Mr. Thorpe's cooperation. (R. at 413-14). Defendant 
did not object. 
Defendant, waited until January 7, 1994, when he finally 
objected to Plaintiff's expert witness by moving to exclude the 
witness. (R. at 364). Not only was Defendant's objection 
improper because it was untimely, but it also prejudiced 
Plaintiff's case. Due to Defendant's misrepresentations, 
Plaintiff continued to prepare his case and incur expenses for 
the preparation of his expert witness. Assuming, arguendo, that 
Defendant had a valid objection, due to his failure to timely 
object, it should be held that he waived his right to do so. 
G. DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DESIGNATION 
OF MR. THORPE AS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
In the Ruling on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation of 
Expert Witness, the court found that the Defendant was prejudiced 
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because of the late designation of Plaintiff's expert witness. 
(R. at 413). 
Prior to the scheduling order, Plaintiff and Defendant were 
in frequent contact as to Plaintiff's difficulty in finding an 
expert that would testify against a city in Utah. (R. at 465). 
Plaintiff located Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, an engineering firm 
in Salt Lake, which was willing to provide an expert to testify 
at trial. Plaintiff properly listed the engineering firm in his 
Witness list to Defendant on September 30, 1993. (R. at 302-04). 
On September 30, 1993, the only fact that Plaintiff knew was 
that Eckhoff, Watson & Preator would provide an expert. The firm 
had not yet selected the expert who would testify. Defendant, 
recognizing Plaintiff's position, expressed a willingness to 
cooperate. Defendant, in a letter dated November 24, 1993, 
requested that as soon as Plaintiff discovers who would testify 
for the firm, that he inform Defendant. (R. at 413). The fact 
that the name was not disclosed does not relieve Defendant of the 
duty to notice the deposition of the witness. Rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the manner for doing so 
and that it is the responsibility of the party seeking the 
deposition to notice the deposition. 
Defendant was informed by phone, in late November, that 
Gregory Thorpe was selected to represent the engineering firm. 
(R. at 465). Plaintiff indicated to Defendant that Mr. Thorpe 
still had to review some materials and therefore had not yet 
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formed an opinion. (R. at 414). However, Defendant could depose 
him at any time. (R at 465). 
Defendant never expressed a complaint with delaying the 
deposition of the expert. It appeared that his only worry was to 
not lose the opportunity to depose the witness after the 
discovery deadline. Plaintiff made it clear that he could depose 
the expert at any time. (R. at 465). 
It was not a basis for surprise that Plaintiff did not 
inform Defendant until November of who would represent Eckhoff, 
Watson & Preator at trial. Defendant knew all along that an 
expert from Eckhoff, Watson & Preator would testify. Therefore, 
Defendant could not claim prejudice. Contrary to Defendant's 
claim, this was not a designation of a new witness. Plaintiff 
simply advised Defendant that Gregory Thorpe would represent 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, who was already designated as a 
witness. 
Defendant's case was not prejudiced by the fact that the 
name of the expert was not given. Instead, this benefitted 
Defendant. Had Defendant noticed Eckhoff, Watson & Preator for 
deposition, the firm would have had to select a representative in 
time for the deposition. U.R.C.P. 30(a)(6). Furthermore, the 
expert would have been held, at the time of trial, to his opinion 
as of the date of the deposition. Had Plaintiff failed to 
provide the expert with the necessary materials to form an 
opinion, Defendant could have successfully crippled the expert 
witness' testimonial effect in the case. Defendant did not act 
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promptly. Instead, Defendant waited over a month after he was 
informed of Mr. Thorpe's willingness to testify, then moved the 
court to exclude Mr. Thorpe as a witness. (R. at 364). 
In the case at bar, the parties cooperated with each other 
without petitioning the court for approval to deviate slightly 
from the schedule. Defendant's case was not prejudiced by this. 
Defendant always knew of the expert and could have noticed 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator for deposition at any time. 
In Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
(Ct.App. 1992), the defendant agreed to allow the plaintiff to 
serve a list of witnesses after the April 19, 1991 scheduling 
date requirement. The agreement was to provide the list if 
settlement was not successful. June 28, 1991 settlement 
negotiations ended. Plaintiff provided the witness list on 
August 19, 1991. This court found that the plaintiff violated 
the scheduling order. Justice Orme, in the dissent, agreed with 
the result of the decision but not with the analysis. 
Justice Orme stated: 
counsel ought to have some flexibility to resolve minor 
matters between themselves. Indeed, limited judicial 
resources are preserved by not requiring counsel to bother 
the court for approval every time they perceive some need to 
massage the preliminary details of a scheduling order. 
In the case at bar, the parties' cooperation should not be 
disregarded. To now apply the strict scheduling dates would be 
improper given the parties' own actions and representations. 
The court in Berrett. quoting Jansen v. Lichwa, 474 P. 2d 
1020 (Ariz.App. 1970), stated: 
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the sanction was improper when complaining party consented 
to continuing discovery until trial. 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992). 
In the case at bar, the court's sanction, excluding 
Plaintiff's witness, was also improper. 
ISSUE 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Jury instructions must not only instruct the jury as to the 
law of the jurisdiction, but the instructions given must also "be 
appropriate to the fact situation of the case as was revealed by 
the evidence." Schultz v. Ouintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978). 
In the case at bar, instruction #17 failed to instruct the 
jury as to the law of the jurisdiction and was not appropriate to 
the fact situation of the case as revealed by the evidence. 
Instruction #17 reads as follows: 
the defendant is negligent if, but only if, he (a) knows or 
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the 
condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or 
will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails 
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the 
danger. 
(Tr. at 238-39) 
Instruction #17 is based, in part, on the Restatement of 
Torts section 343 as it was applied in English v. Kienke, 848 
P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts is 
a correct statement of the law regarding premises liability. 
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However, the direct application of the undisputed facts, as they 
appeared in English, to Section 343, as it is written, was 
appropriate only because the case was decided on summary 
judgment. Plaintiff objects to its use as an instruction to a 
jury which has the duty to weigh the evidence and apply 
principles of comparative negligence to the facts. Plaintiff 
properly objected to it's use during trial. (Tr. at 230). 
Any case dealing with injury to visitors upon land must be 
based upon principles of premises liability. Premises liability 
is well established in the State of Utah. The injured visitor is 
classified as either an Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser. In the 
case at bar, the Plaintiff is properly classified as an invitee. 
According to Utah premises liability law, the duty that a 
landowner owes to an invitee is the duty to discover unreasonably 
dangerous conditions and remedy them or warn the visitor of them. 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 
754 P.2d 89 (Ct.App.1988). Stephenson v. Warner et. al., 581 
P.2d 567 (Utah 1978). Plaintiff offered proper instructions 
which applied the foregoing principles, however, the court 
refused to use apply them in the case at bar. 
Use of instruction #17, in the case at bar, substantially 
prejudiced the Plaintiff's case by taking from the Plaintiff the 
right to have his fault compared to the fault attributable to the 
Defendant. The instruction caused the jury to revert back to 
principles of contributory negligence finding that if the 
Plaintiff was also negligent, recovery is barred. (Tr. at 273). 
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The instruction sufficiently misled the jury as to the 
appropriate law applicable to premises liability. It applied the 
"open and obvious" danger rule, which the State of Utah no longer 
recognizes. Had the proper instruction been given, a fair 
comparison of fault would have been made to make a proper 
determination of liability. Plaintiff would have recovered. 
I. INSTRUCTION #17 WAS NOT THE PROPER INSTRUCTION. 
Instruction #17 is taken from the Restatement Second of 
Torts Section 343 (1965). Section 343 is a correct statement of 
the law regarding landowner liability and was appropriately 
applied in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (1993) . However, in 
the case at bar, it is not a proper instruction when dealing with 
the weighing of evidence by a jury and the application of 
comparative negligence principles. 
A. INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT PROPER BASED ON THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE AS REVEALED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Subsection (b) of Instruction #17 absolves the defendant of 
any liability if defendant "should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger or will fail to protect themselves 
against it." (Tr. at 238-39). In other words, if the danger at 
the dump is obvious, a reasonable person would realize it. If 
Plaintiff nevertheless proceeds to encounter the danger, then 
defendant is not liable for plaintiff's resulting injuries. Such 
an instruction is not appropriate to the fact situation of the 
case as revealed by the evidence. 
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The site of the injury was a municipal dump. A city 
ordinance requires city residents to subscribe to a garbage 
retrieval service. (Tr. at 151-152). The City of Blanding does 
not provide garbage retrieval for citizens living within the 
county but outside city limits. (Tr. at 151-152). A special 
arrangement must be made with a private contractor for a resident 
outside city limits to receive garbage retrieval service. (Tr. 
at 152). Without a special arrangement, the only location 
provided for citizens, who live outside city limits, to dispose 
of garbage is the dump where the injury occurred. (Tr. at 151-
152) . Blanding citizens are required by law to use the dump to 
dispose of garbage that is not collected through a garbage 
retrieval service. Blanding citizens are not allowed to dispose 
of garbage at any other location. (Tr. at 151-152). 
Furthermore, Blanding citizens are not allowed to leave the 
garbage along the edge of the precipice, but are required to 
throw the garbage over the edge. (Tr. at 137). A wall, 10-18" 
in height, separates a person and the edge of the cliff over 
which the garbage is thrown. (Tr. at 21, 151). On the day of 
the accident, strong winds whipped through the canyon, and smoke 
from several small fires in the dump clouded the sky. (Tr. at 
132-33). The dump had recently been bulldozed by the defendant, 
exposing those at the dump to a 30-40 foot precipice. (Tr. at 
141-42) . 
Plaintiff, like all citizens of Blanding, was required, by 
city ordinance, to incur the risks inherent in the dump site to 
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dispose of his garbage. The Defendant, as a landowner, had a 
duty to Plaintiff, as an invitee, to discover unreasonably 
dangerous conditions at the dump and remedy them or give 
Plaintiff sufficient warning of them. Schultz v. Ouintana, 576 
P.2d 855 (1978). Defendant cannot require the Plaintiff to use 
the dump, then absolve itself of liability when the Plaintiff is 
injured at the dump. Subsection (b) of Instruction #17 produces 
such an effect. (Tr. at 238-39). 
The instruction offered to the jury by the court should have 
reflected the facts of this case. The instruction should have 
reflected that Plaintiff was required by Defendant to use the 
dump and approach the edge of a 30 to 40 foot precipice, which 
had recently been created by Defendant's bulldozing. (Tr. at 
141-42, 151-52) . It should have reflected that strong winds 
whipped through the canyon on that particular day, and smoke from 
several fires rose up from the dump to the platform. (Tr. at 
132-33) . It should have reflected that others had been injured 
at the dump and the city was aware of it. (Tr. at 139). 
Instruction #17 did not reflect those facts and therefore was 
incorrect and prejudiced the Plaintiff. Had a proper instruction 
been given, which properly took into consideration those facts, 
Defendant would have been found negligent for not protecting the 
Plaintiff from those dangers. 
B. INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE 
LAW OF THE JURISDICTION. 
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The effect of instruction #17 is to ignore principles of 
comparative negligence and to revert back to a contributory 
negligence system. The instruction states that the defendant was 
negligent only if it failed to protect the Plaintiff from a 
dangerous condition, which the Defendant knew or should have 
known existed and should have expected that Plaintiff would not 
realize it. (Tr. at 239). The corollary is that if the 
Plaintiff knew or should have realized the dangerous condition of 
the dump, yet proceeded to encounter the danger, he assumed the 
risk and recovery is completely barred. 
This type of instruction is appropriate only in a 
contributory negligence system. The deceiving element is 
subsection (b) of the instruction, which is the determining 
factor of whether the defendant is liable to plaintiff entirely 
or not at all. 
The State of Utah has abandoned its contributory negligence 
system. Donahue v. Durfee. 780. P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 
(Ct.App.1989). Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994), is titled 
"Comparative Negligence," and states: 
the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. 
The same section defines fault to mean: 
any actionable breach of legal duty... including, but not 
limited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk,... 
This court held in Donahue that 
the adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to 
an expression by the Legislature that the harsh and 
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inflexible result of total victory or unconditional defeat 
compelled by the traditional contributory negligence system, 
including the open and obvious danger rule, is no longer 
acceptable. 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 
(Ct.App.1989). 
The use of an instruction, such as instruction #17, produces 
one of two results. First, if the jury determines that the 
plaintiff was not also negligent, the defendant is entirely 
liable for the injuries to plaintiff. Second, if the jury 
determines that the plaintiff was also negligent, regardless of 
the degree, defendant is absolved of any liability. Any 
instruction which is based on principles of contributory 
negligence is inappropriate. 
What one would expect, when a jury is given an instruction 
based on principles of contributory negligence, occurred in the 
case at bar. (Tr. at 269-270). The jury could not weigh the 
evidence and apportion fault to the parties because instruction 
#17 did not allow it. Either the danger was open and obvious and 
Plaintiff assumed the danger by negligently encountering it, or 
it was not and Plaintiff could not be required to avoid it. The 
jury's actions were consistent with a jury bound to a 
contributory negligence system. 
This result is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, under 
the instructions given, the jury was unable to apportion fault in 
the manner it desired. (Tr. at 269-70). The jury's frustration 
and confusion is apparent in its mid-deliberation petition to the 
court for further instruction. In desperation, the jury 
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questioned the judge, in writing, for additional instruction. 
The jury asked: 
Judge, the majority of us feel that both parties are at 
fault to some extent. Therefore, would it be allowable to 
compensate Mr. Laws a monetary amount for pain and suffering 
incurred for his injuries? If so, how can we go about this? 
(Tr. at 269-270). 
Clearly, instruction #17 restricted the jury from comparing fault 
and apportioning it accurately. The response from the judge was 
simply "the answers to your question is in the instructions and 
the verdict form." (Tr. at 271). 
Without further instruction from the judge the jury was 
bound to follow the instructions and the verdict form, even 
though they did not allow the jury to compare fault as it 
desired. The jury's answers to the special verdict form depicts 
the prejudice to the Plaintiff that instruction #17 produced. 
Question: Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as 
alleged by the plaintiff. 
Answer: No. 
(Tr. at 273). 
Even after indicating that the majority of the jurors wanted to 
apportion fault to both parties and award damages, it had to 
answer the question "no". The jury was forced to respond in 
such a way because instruction #17 did not allow a comparative 
negligence analysis. 
Clearly, the instructions, as a whole, were not sufficient 
to remedy the prejudicial effect of instruction #17, even when 
read in their entirety. Had the instructions, read in their 
entirety, been remedial to the misleading effect of instruction 
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#17, the jury would have apportioned fault and awarded damages as 
it indicated to the judge that it wanted to do. Or had a proper 
instruction on duty been given, the jury would have been able to 
properly apportion fault and award damages. This error 
prejudiced the Plaintiff's case because Plaintiff was not allowed 
the privilege of a comparison of his fault with that fault 
attributable to defendant. Consequently, Plaintiff was denied a 
recovery that the jury desired to award but couldn't. 
C. INSTRUCTION #17 APPLIES THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER 
RULE, WHICH IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS STATE. 
In effect, the result of Instruction #17 is to apply the 
open and obvious danger rule to premises liability. The 
traditional open and obvious danger rule held that the landowner 
had no duty to warn or protect the invitee of any dangerous 
condition that was open and obvious. Ellertson V. Dansie, 576 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1978). The reasoning behind the open and obvious 
danger rule was stated by the court in Donahue v. Durfee, 780 
P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989): 
encountering an open and obvious risk is negligence as a 
matter of law and, at least under a contributory negligence 
system, a plaintiff who is even only slightly negligent is 
barred from recovery. 
Instruction #17 misleads the jury as to Defendant's duty. 
According to the instruction, if the danger at the dump is open 
and obvious, yet plaintiff unreasonably chooses to encounter the 
danger and is injured, then defendant is absolved of any duty to 
protect the plaintiff. 
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The consequences of such a rule are that an open and obvious 
danger rule does not differentiate between those facts relevant 
to the landowner's duty of care and those facts establishing a 
total or partial defense to liability. Under comparative 
negligence principles, a plaintiff's unreasonable encounter of a 
known danger should be relevant to establishing a defense to 
liability. Defendant's duty of care is the same whether the 
plaintiff was unreasonable or not. However, under instruction 
#17, Plaintiff's unreasonable encounter is used to establish 
Defendant's lack of a duty of care. 
The use of an instruction such as instruction #17 is no 
longer the law in Utah. Donahue v. Durfee. 780 P.2d 1275, 118 
Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989). The facts in Donahue are 
similar to the case at bar. The plaintiff was working on the 
roof of a building where a high voltage wire hung near the roof. 
"Donahue was not warned about the powerline but saw it and 
perceived the potentially fatal danger which it posed." This 
court held that: 
the Utah Legislature has by necessary implication abolished 
the open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an 
injured guest's recovery. Our conclusion is premised on two 
grounds. 
First, the open and obvious danger rule is fundamentally 
incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, which 
requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an 
injury based on the relative responsibility of the parties 
involved. 
Our second point of analysis is premised upon the fact that 
the assumption of the risk doctrine has been expressly 
abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to recovery due to its 
incompatibility with our comparative negligence system. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (1987). See also Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981). 
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Jacobson Constr. Co. V. Strutco-Lite Ena'cr, Inc., 619 P.2d 
306, 309 (Utah 1980). 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
Principles of comparative negligence demand that: 
a plaintiff's knowledge, whether it is derived from a 
warning or from the facts, even if the facts display the 
danger openly and obviously, is a matter that bears upon 
plaintiff's own negligence; it should not affect the 
defendant's duty. 
Parker V. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, (Tex. 1978). 
In the case at bar, instruction #17 caused that the 
Plaintiff's contributory negligence affect the establishment of 
Defendant's duty. The jury, determined that both parties were 
negligent. (Tr. at 269-70). The jury, however, was compelled to 
find that Defendant lacked a duty to protect the Plaintiff due to 
the Plaintiff's contributory negligence. Plaintiff's rights 
demand that the jury "allocate liability based on the relative 
responsibility of the parties involved." Donahue v. Durfee. 780 
P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989). 
Separate instructions should have been given to the jury 
which would have properly separated the determination of 
Defendant's duty from the analysis of Plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. Plaintiff's Instructions numbers 17-19 were 
appropriate instructions in this case. (R. at 423). 
Plaintiff's Instruction #19 properly instructed the jury on 
a landowner's duty of care to an invitee. Instruction #19 
stated: 
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Blanding City is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at the 
Blanding City Dump if Blanding City: 
a) Knew of the dangerous condition, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous condition 
existed; and 
b) That sufficient time had elapsed to take corrective 
action. 
Several Utah Courts have applied a landowner's duty of care 
instruction in the same manner. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Ut.Ct.App.1991) . Williams v. Melbv. 699 
P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d 567, 
568 (Utah 1978). Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 565 P.2d 1139, 
1140-41 (Utah 1977). Ohlson v. Safewav Stores, Inc.. 568 P.2d 
753 (Utah 1977). Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 
(Utah 1973). Hampton v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 
350 P.2d 151 (1960). Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 
284 P.2d 477 (1955) . Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. et al., 232 
P.2d 210, 120 Utah 31 (1951). 
Upon reversal and remand of Donahue, the court stated: 
at trial the finder of fact must compare the reasonableness 
of Donahue's conduct under all the circumstances in 
encountering the power line with the reasonableness of 
DVF's, Durfee's, and Howell's conduct in creating and 
allowing the potentially deadly power line to remain so near 
the warehouse roof, in an activated state, while work was 
being done on the roof. 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 
(Ct.App.1989). 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the finder of fact should have 
compared the reasonableness of Plaintiff's conduct in 
encountering the dangers of the dump with the reasonableness of 
Defendant's conduct in creating and maintaining the dump in a 
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dangerous condition. All the circumstances should have been 
considered in the comparison. Such circumstances would include 
the fact that Plaintiff was not allowed to dispose of garbage 
except at the dump site and was required to throw the garbage 
over the edge of a 30 to 40 foot precipice, where a low 10 to 18 
inch wall was the only guard to prevent falling. (Tr. at 21, 
151-153). While, the Defendant had taken no steps to protect 
individuals from the dangers of the dump. (Tr. at 140). 
Defendant argues that Section 343 of the Restatement Second 
of Torts allowed the jury to properly decide the case and, 
therefore, was properly applied in the case at bar just as it was 
applied in English v.Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (1993). This is 
incorrect. Although Section 343 was correctly applied in 
English, its application is limited to the facts of that case. 
English was decided on summary judgment. On summary 
judgment, the rule is clear that the court is prohibited from 
weighing the evidence and determining negligence. The court in 
English determined whether there were any genuine issues of 
material fact. In its analysis it applied uncontested material 
facts to the law applicable to the matter. A weighing of the 
evidence and comparison of fault was prohibited; therefore, a 
direct application of the law to the facts was apropos. 
In the case at bar, it was not appropriate for the jury to 
do the same because the responsibility of the jury is to weigh 
the evidence and apportion fault. In the case at bar, a direct 
application to the rule, as done in English, took that 
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responsibility away from the jury. The instruction misled the 
jury because, as written, it caused the jury to make its 
determination based upon principles of contributory negligence. 
The jury was compelled to determine the case based on the open 
and obvious danger rule and assumption of the risk. The jury 
decided that, because the danger was open and obvious, Plaintiff 
assumed the risk and therefore, Defendant had no duty to protect 
him. (Tr. at 269-73). This, the jury decided, even though they 
desired to apportion fault to Defendant and award Plaintiff 
damages. (Tr. at 269-73). 
D. AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343 OF THE RESTATEMENT SECOND 
OF TORTS IS ONLY PROPER WHEN GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343A. 
Assuming, arguendo, that instruction #17 was the correct 
instruction according to the law of the jurisdiction, then an 
additional instruction was necessary for clarification. An 
instruction similar to Section 343A of the Restatement Second of 
Torts was necessary to clarify the intent of subsection (b) of 
Section 343, from which the instruction was taken. Comment (a) 
of the Reporter's Notes to section 343, states: 
this section should be read together with §343A, which deals 
with the effect of the fact that the condition is known to 
the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact that 
the invitee is a patron of a public utility. 
Restatement Second of Torts, §343 cmt. a (1965). 
Section 343A of the Restatement Second of Torts states 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on 
the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless 
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the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate 
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the 
invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the 
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance 
indicating that the harm should be anticipated. 
Restatement Second of Torts, §343A (1965). 
The importance of this section in conjunction with Section 343 is 
that it clarifies the duties of the possessor and invitee when an 
open and obvious dangerous condition exists on the land of a 
public utility, government, or government agency. 
Comment (a) to Section 343A states that this rule applies to 
all invitees, including "members of the public making use of the 
land of the government or government agency which is held open 
for the use of the public." Most significant in comment (a) is: 
as is stated in Subsection (2), such a public utility, 
government, or government agency may have special reason to 
anticipate that one who so enters will proceed to encounter 
known or obvious dangers; and such a defendant may therefore 
be subject to liability in some cases where the ordinary 
possessor of land would not. 
If the court determined that instruction #17 was necessary 
and appropriate under the circumstances of this case, the court 
should have included an instruction mirroring Section 343A. The 
facts of this case warranted such a clarifying instruction. 
Comment f. of the Reporter's Notes to Section 343A states: 
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can 
and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will 
cause physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding its known 
or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is not 
relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the 
invitee for his protection. This duty may require him to 
warn the invitee, or take other reasonable steps to protect 
him, against the known or obvious condition or activity, if 
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the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will 
nevertheless suffer physical harm. 
Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to 
expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known 
or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his 
position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the 
apparent risk. 
Comment g. of the Restatement Second of Torts Section 343A 
states: 
In determining whether the possessor of land should expect 
harm to invitees notwithstanding the known or obvious 
character of the danger, the fact that premises have been 
held open to the visitor, and that he has been invited to 
use them, is always a factor to be considered, as offering 
some assurance to the invitee that the place has been 
prepared for his reception, and that reasonable care has 
been used to make it safe. There is, however, a special 
reason for the possessor to anticipate harm where the 
possessor is a public utility, which has undertaken to 
render services to members of the public... The same is 
true of the government, or a government agency, which 
maintains land upon which the public are invited and 
entitled to enter as a matter of public right. Such 
defendants may reasonably expect the public, in the course 
of the entry of use to which they are entitled, to proceed 
to encounter some known or obvious dangers which are not 
unduly extreme, rather than to forego the right. 
The foregoing comments to Section 343A were written for the case 
at bar. 
Here, the Plaintiff was required by city ordinance to 
dispose of his garbage at the dump. (Tr. at 152-153) . Plaintiff 
was not allowed to leave the garbage near the edge of the 
precipice, but he was required to throw the garbage over the edge 
of a 30 to 40 foot precipice. (Tr. at 137, 152-153). A low 10 to 
18 inch wall was the only guard to prevent falling. (Tr. at 
21,151). The Defendant had recently bulldozed the dump creating 
the 30 to 40 foot precipice. (Tr. at 141-42) . Clearly, 
Defendant was in a position to realize that even though the 
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Plaintiff may have realized the dangerous condition of the dump, 
Plaintiff would nevertheless proceed to encounter them. 
Defendant nevertheless, failed to take any steps to protect 
individuals using the dump. (Tr. at 140). 
Had an instruction similar to Section 343A been given, a 
proper analysis of the facts could have been made by the jury. 
Without this instruction, the jury was misled and Plaintiff's 
case was prejudiced. The jury was left to decide only that the 
dangerous condition of the dump should have been known or obvious 
to the Plaintiff. Consequently, any injuries sustained from 
encountering the danger were due to the Plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. 
II. PROPER INSTRUCTION MUST BE FOUNDED ON TRADITIONAL PREMISES 
LIABILITY PRINCIPLES. 
Given the facts of the case at bar, proper instruction 
should have been based on traditional premises liability 
principles, which are well established in the State of Utah. 
A. DEFENDANT HAS DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF FROM 
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON PREMISES. 
"The duty of care owed by a possessor of land is determined 
by the status of the person who comes onto the property." Pratt 
v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991). The 
relationship between the parties (injured and possessor) 
determines the status of the plaintiff at the time of the injury, 
as a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. Gregory v. 
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Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 
(Ct.App.1988). Such status determines the measure of duty owed 
by the landowner to the injured, and therefore the landowner's 
liability, if his breach of such duty caused the injury. Gregory 
v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 
24 (Ct.App.1988). Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, (Utah 1979). 
Under the facts of this case, Plaintiff is considered an 
invitee. 
Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement Second of Torts 
properly explain premises liability as applied to invitees. 
Section 343 states: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land, but 
only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would discover the condition, and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them 
against the danger. 
Section 343A states: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on 
the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless 
the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate 
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the 
invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the 
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance 
indicating that the harm should be anticipated. 
Restatement Second of Torts §343A . 
B. THE JURY INSTRUCTION MUST CORRECTLY STATE DEFENDANT'S 
DUTY WITHOUT ABROGATING THIS STATE'S COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM. 
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Although Section 343 of the Restatement Second of Torts is 
the law applicable to premises liability, as an instruction, it 
supplants comparative negligence with contributory negligence. 
To preserve principles of comparative negligence, Section 343 
must be divided into separate instructions. One instruction must 
address the landowner's duty as described in Section 343A and 
Subsections (a) and (c) of Section 343. The second instruction 
must address the visitor's contributory negligence as written in 
Subsection (b) of Section 343. 
The method of determining a landowner's breach of duty as 
stated in Section 343A and Subsections (a) and (c) of Section 343 
has been, and continues to be, as stated in Martin v. Safeway 
Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977). Although this and 
subsequent cases are "slip-and-fall" cases, the principles of 
premises liability are the same. 
In Martin, the court stated: 
the essential inquiry relating to defendant's negligence is 
whether the defendant's employees knew, or in the exercise 
of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed 
thereafter that action could have been taken to correct the 
situation. 
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977) . 
The same analysis continues to be made by the courts in 
determining a landowner's breach of duty. Gregory v. Fourthwest 
Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 
(Ct.App.1988). Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 
(Utah Ct.App. 1987). Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 200 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 61 (Ct.App. 1991). Allen v. Federated Dairy 
Farms. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975). 
In fact, in Gregory, the court held that in order to find 
the defendant liable: 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant knew, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a 
dangerous condition existed and that sufficient time had 
elapsed to take corrective action. 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App. 1988). 
In the case at bar, the jury should have been instructed on 
the foregoing principles of premises liability. The first 
inquiry should have been whether the Defendant knew or should 
have known of the dangerous condition. The second inquiry should 
have been whether sufficient time elapsed that Defendant could 
have taken corrective action to remedy the situation. 
Plaintiff's Instructions #17-19 instructed the jury accordingly. 
Plaintiff objected to the courts refusal to use the appropriate 
instruction. (Tr. at 230) . 
A separate instruction should have addressed the Plaintiff's 
contributory negligence as written in subsection (b) of section 
343 of the Restatement Second of Torts. The inquiry should have 
been whether a reasonable person would have realized the 
dangerous condition and avoided it. Taken into consideration 
should have been the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's 
encountering the danger as noted in Section 343A of the 
Restatement Second of Torts. 
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The danger of combining the two instructions is that the 
Plaintiff's contributory negligence may be held to abrogate 
Defendant's duty. The court said in Parker V. Highland Park, 
Inc. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978): 
a plaintiff's knowledge, whether it is derived from a 
warning or from the facts, even if the facts display the 
danger openly and obviously, is a matter that bears upon 
plaintiff's own negligence; it should not affect the 
defendant's duty. 
If the Plaintiff's negligence is analyzed under an instruction 
similar to Instruction #17, the determination of Defendant's duty 
is affected. In other words, what happened in the case at bar is 
the outcome. Even though the majority of the jurors desired to 
apportion fault to both parties, they were forced to abrogate 
Defendant's duty because the instruction did not allow the jury 
to apportion and compare fault. (Tr. at 269-273) . 
An example of the correct approach in applying the 
Restatement to jury instructions is found in Erickson v. Walgreen 
Drug Co. et al., 232 P.2d 210, 120 Utah 31 (1951). In Erickson, 
the court quoted the Restatement of Torts and acknowledged it to 
be the correct rule of law governing premises liability. The 
instruction given to apply that rule was as follows: 
it was the duty of [the appellant] to exercise reasonable 
care to keep the entranceway to its store reasonably safe 
for the use of its customers; and in this regard you are 
instructed that if you shall find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the entranceway was not reasonably safe in 
that the floor of the entranceway had become wet from rain 
water and slick and slippery and that [the appellant] knew 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of 
said condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to 
remedy said condition and make said entranceway reasonably 
safe for the use of its customers, by means of warning signs 
to advise of the slick condition or by covering the terrazzo 
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entrance with rubber mats or other substances to prevent 
slipping, then [the appellant] was negligent; 
The court stated in Ohlson v. Safeway Stores Inc., that 
the jury was properly instructed that the defendant could 
not be held liable for any injury suffered by plaintiff, a 
business invitee, resulting from a dangerous condition not 
caused by acts of the defendant itself and of which the 
defendant had no knowledge, unless that condition existed 
for such a length of time that if the defendant exercised 
ordinary care it would have discovered the condition and 
could and would have remedied it before the time of the 
injury. 
Even though the foregoing courts adhered to the Restatement rule 
of premises liability, their jury instructions reflect the 
correct approach in applying the rule. It is the same approach 
petitioned by the Plaintiff in the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's designation of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as 
witness #14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses was a proper 
designation. Plaintiff did not violate the court's scheduling 
order. The court's exclusion of Plaintiff's expert witness 
therefore, was an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff's expert testimony applied directly to the issues 
on which the jury was to base its decision. The design, 
construction, maintenance and safety precautions were important 
elements in deciding whether Defendant had a duty and breached 
it. Exclusion of the witness, prevented the Plaintiff from 
presenting his entire case to a jury, which substantially 
prejudiced Plaintiff's case. 
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Instruction #17 in the case at bar supplanted this state's 
comparative negligence system with contributory negligence 
principles. The jury was misled by the instruction and compelled 
to determine that Plaintiff's contributory negligence abrogated 
Defendant's duty. The record clearly indicates that the jury 
desired to apportion fault to both parties, yet it was compelled 
to abrogate Defendant's duty because the instruction did not 
allow the jury to apportion and compare fault. (Tr. at 269-273). 
The misleading instruction was not remedied by a reading of 
the instructions in their entirety. Instead, the jury was 
compelled to act within principles of contributory negligence and 
abrogate the Defendant's duty and find the Plaintiff entirely at 
fault, thereby denying Plaintiff any recovery. 
Plaintiff contends that the instruction given was incorrect. 
Plaintiff further contends that the misleading effect of the 
instruction substantially prejudiced the Plaintiff's case and 
affected his rights. Had this error not been committed, the 
result of this case would have been different. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decision of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this ' ffft day of [ jj^o^Jr , 1994. 
O 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
DONALD E. M^ CAJJDLESS 
DARWIN C. FIStfER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
51 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the foil, this 
fffih, day of August, 1994: 
Gary B. Ferguson 
Attorney for Defendant/Appelle 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
RONALD E. Mc^afopLESs 




Rule 28 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 448 
resent them, and, in case they are not otherwise 
represented, shall cross-examine the deponent. If 
any expected adverse party is a minor or incom-
petent the provisions of Rule 17(c) apply. 
(3) Order and examination. If the court is 
satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony 
may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall 
make an order designating or describing the per-
sons whose depositions may be taken and specify-
ing the subject matter of the examination and 
whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral 
examination or written interrogatories. The de-
positions may then be taken in accordance with 
these rules; and the court may make orders of the 
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For 
the purpose of applying these rules to depositions 
for perpetuating testimony, each reference 
therein to the court in which the action is pend-
ing shall be deemed to refer to the court in which 
the petition for such deposition was filed. 
(4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to per-
petuate testimony is taken under these rules or 
if, although not so taken, it would be admissible 
in evidence in the courts of the state in which it 
is taken, it may be used in any action involving 
the same subject matter subsequently brought in 
any court of this state, in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 26(d) (Rule 32(a)]. 
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken 
from a judgment of a district court or before the tak-
ing of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, 
the district court in which the judgment was rendered 
may allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses 
to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of 
further proceedings in such court. In such case the 
party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may 
make a motion in the district court for leave to take 
the depositions, upon the same notice and service 
thereof as if the action was pending in the district 
court. The motion shall show (1) the names and ad-
dresses of persons to be examined and the substance 
of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each; 
(2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If 
the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony 
is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may 
make an order allowing the depositions to be taken 
and may make orders of the character provided for by 
Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon the depositions may 
be taken and used in the same manner and under the 
same conditions as are prescribed in these rules for 
depositions taken in actions pending in the district 
court. 
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an action to 
perpetuate testimony. 
Rule 28. Persons before whom depositions may 
be taken. 
(a) Within the United States. Within the United 
States or within a territory or insular possession sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, deposi-
tions shall be taken before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths by the laws of the United States or 
of the place where the examination is held, or before 
a person appointed by the court in which the action is 
pending. A person so appointed has power to adminis-
ter oaths and take testimony. The term "officer" as 
used in Rules 30, 31, and 32 includes a person ap-
pointed by the court or designated by the parties un-
der Rule 29. 
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, de-
positions may be taken (1) on notice before a person 
authorized to administer oaths in the place in which 
the examination is held, either by the law thereof or 
by the law of the United States, or (2) before a person 
commissioned by the court, and a person so commis-
sioned shall have the power by virtue of his commis-
sion to administer any necessary oath and take testi-
mony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commis-
sion or a letter rogatory shall be issued on application 
and notice and on terms that are just and appropri-
ate. It is not requisite to the issuance of a commission 
or a letter rogatory that the taking of the deposition 
in any other manner is impracticable or inconve-
nient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory 
may be issued in proper cases. A notice or commission 
may designate the person before whom the deposition 
is to be taken either by name or descriptive title. A 
letter rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate 
Authority in [here name of country]-" Evidence ob-
tained in response to a letter rogatory need not be 
excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verba-
tim transcript or that the testimony was not taken 
under oath or for any similar departure from the re-
quirements for depositions taken within the United 
States under these rules. 
(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition 
shall be taken before a person who is a relative or 
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, 
or is a relative or employee of such attorney or coun-
sel, or is financially interested in the action. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 29. Stipulations regarding discovery pro-
cedure. 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may 
by written stipulation 
(1) provide that depositions may be taken be-
fore any person, at any time or place, upon any 
notice, and in any manner and when so taken 
may be used like other depositions, and 
(2) modify the procedures provided by these 
rules for other methods of discovery. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination. 
(a) When depositions may be taken. After com-
mencement of the action, any party may take the 
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposi-
tion upon oral examination. Leave of court, granted 
with or without notice, must be obtained only if the 
plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expira-
tion of 30 days after service of the summons and com-
plaint upon any defendant or service made under 
Rule 4(e), except that leave is not required (1) if a 
defendant has served a notice of taking deposition or 
otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if special notice is 
given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by 
subpoena as provided in Rule 45. The deposition of a 
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave 
of court on such terms as the court prescribes. 
(b) Notice of examination; general require-
ments; special notice; non-stenographic record-
ing; production of documents and things; deposi-
tion of organization; deposition by telephone. 
(DA party desiring to take the deposition of 
any person upon oral examination shall give rea-
sonable notice in writing to every other party to 
the action. The notice shall state the time and 
place for taking the deposition and the name and 
address of each person to be examined, if known, 
and, if the name is not known, a general descrip-
tion sufficient to identify him or the particular 
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class or group to which he belongs. If a subpoena 
duces tecum is to be served on the person to be 
examined, the designation of the materials to be 
produced as set forth in the subpoena shall be 
attached to or included in the notice. 
(2) Leave of court is not required for the tak-
ing of a deposition by plaintiff if the notice (A) 
states that the person to be examined is about to 
go out of the district where the action is pending 
and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, 
or is about to go out of the United States, or is 
bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable 
for examination unless his deposition is taken 
before expiration of the 30-day period, and (B) 
sets forth facts to support the statement. The 
plaintiffs attorney shall sign the notice, and his 
signature constitutes a certification by him that 
to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief the statement and supporting facts are 
true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are ap-
plicable to the certification. 
If a party shows that when he was served with 
notice under this Subdivision (b)(2) he was un-
aule through the exercise of diligence to obtain 
counsel to represent him at the taking of the de-
position, the deposition may not be used against 
him. 
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or 
shorten the time for taking the deposition. 
(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the 
court may upon motion order that the testimony 
at a deposition be recorded by other than steno-
graphic means. The stipulation or order shall 
designate the person before whom the deposition 
shall be taken and the manner of recording, pre-
serving, and filing the deposition and may in-
clude other provisions to assure that the recorded 
testimony will be accurate and trustworthy. A 
party may arrange to have a stenographic tran-
scription made at his own expense. Any objec-
tions under Subdivision (c), any changes made by 
the witness, his signature identifying the deposi-
tion as his own or the statement of the officer 
that is required if the witness does not sign, as 
provided in Subdivision (e), and the certification 
of the officer required by Subdivision (f) shall be 
set forth in a writing to accompany a deposition 
recorded by nonstenographic means. 
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be ac-
companied by a request made in compliance with 
Rule 34 for the production of documents and tan-
gible things at the taking of the deposition. The 
procedure of Rule 34 shall apply to the request. 
(6) A party may in his notice and in a sub-
poena name as the deponent a public or private 
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a 
governmental agency and describe with reason-
able particularity the matters on which examina-
tion is requested. In that event, the organization 
so named shall designate one or more officers, 
directors, managing agents, or other persons who 
consent to testify on its behalf and may set forth, 
for each person designated, the matters on which 
he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a non-
party organization of its duty to make such a 
designation. The persons so designated shall tes-
tify as to matters known or reasonably available 
to the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does 
not preclude taking a deposition by any other 
procedure authorized in these rules. 
(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the 
court may upon motion order that a deposition be 
taken by telephone. For the purposes of this rule 
and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and 45(d), a deposition 
taken by telephone is taken at the place where 
the deponent is to answer questions propounded 
to him. 
(c) Examination and cross-examination; re-
cord of examination; oath; objections. Examina-
tion and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed 
as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The officer before whom the 
deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on 
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under 
his direction and in his presence record the testimony 
of the witness. The testimony shall be taken steno-
graphically or recorded by any other means ordered 
in accordance with Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If 
requested by one of the parties, the testimony shall be 
transcribed. 
All objections made at the time of the examination 
to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposi-
tion, to the manner of taking it, to the evidence pre-
sented, or to the conduct of any party and any other 
objection to the proceedings shall be noted by the offi-
cer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be 
taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participat-
ing in the oral examination, parties may serve writ-
ten questions in a sealed envelope on the party taking 
the deposition, and he shall transmit them to the offi-
cer, who shall propound them to the witness and 
record the answers verbatim. 
(d) Motion to terminate or limit examination. 
At any time during the taking of the deposition, on 
motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a show-
ing that the examination is being conducted in bad 
faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, 
embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the 
court in which the action is pending or the court in 
the district where the deposition is being taken may 
order the officer conducting the examination to cease 
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit 
the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition 
as provided in Rule 26(c). If the order made termi-
nates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter 
only upon the order of the court in which the action is 
pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or de-
ponent, the taking of the deposition shall be sus-
pended for the time necessary to make a motion for 
an order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the 
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing. 
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposi-
tion shall be submitted to the witness for examina-
tion and shall be read to or by him, unless such exam-
ination and reading are waived by the witness and by 
the parties. Any changes in form or substance which 
the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the 
deposition by the officer with a statement of the rea-
sons given by the witness for making them. The depo-
sition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the 
parties by stipulation waive the signing or the wit-
ness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the 
deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days 
of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and 
state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the 
illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the 
refusal to sign together with the reason, if any, given 
therefore; and the deposition may then be used as 
fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress 
under Rule 32(d)(4) (Rule 32(c)(4)] the court holds 
that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require 
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part. 
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(0 Certification and filing by officer; exhibits; 
copies; notice of filing. 
(1) The officer shall certify on the deposition 
that the witness was duly sworn by him and that 
the deposition is a true record of the testimony 
given by the witness. Unless otherwise ordered 
by the court, he shall then securely seal the depo-
sition in an envelope endorsed with the title of 
the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert 
name of witness]" and shall promptly file it with 
the court in which the action is pending or send it 
by registered or certified mail to the clerk thereof 
for filing. 
Documents and things produced for inspection 
during the examination of the witness shall, 
upon the request of the party, be marked for 
identification and annexed to the deposition and 
may be inspected and copied by any party, except 
that if the person producing the materials desires 
to retain them he may (A) offer copies to be 
marked for identification and annexed to the de-
position and to serve thereafter as originals, if he 
affords to all parties fair opportunity to verify the 
copies by comparison with the originals, or (B) 
offer the originals to be marked for identification, 
after giving to each party an opportunity to in-
spect and copy them, in which event the mate-
rials may be used in the same manner as if an-
nexed to the deposition. Any party may move for 
an order that the original be annexed to and re-
turned with the deposition to the court, pending 
final disposition of the case. 
(2) Upon payment of reasonable charges there-
fore, the officer shall furnish a copy of the deposi-
tion to any party or to the deponent. 
(3) The party taking the deposition shall give 
prompt notice of its filing to all other parties. 
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; ex-
penses. 
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking 
of a deposition fails to attend and proceed there-
with and another party attends in person or by 
attorney pursuant to the notice, the court may 
order the party giving the notice to pay to such 
other party the reasonable expenses incurred by 
him and his attorney in attending, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees. 
(2) If the party giving the notice of the taking 
of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a sub-
poena upon him and the witness because of such 
failure does not attend, and if another party at-
tends in person or by attorney because he expects 
the deposition of that witness to be taken, the 
court may order the party giving the notice to 
pay to such other party the reasonable expenses 
incurred by him and his attorney in attending, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 31. Depositions upon written questions. 
(a) Serving questions; notice. After commence-
ment of the action, any party may take the testimony 
of any person, including a party, by deposition upon 
written questions. The attendance of witnesses may 
be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided by 
Rule 45. The deposition of a person confined in prison 
may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as 
the court prescribes. 
A party desiring to take a deposition upon written 
questions shall serve them upon every other party 
with a notice stating (1) the name and address of the 
person who is to answer them, if known, and if the 
name is not known, a general description sufficient to 
identify him or the particular class or group to which 
he belongs, and (2) the name or descriptive title and 
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to 
be taken. A deposition upon written questions may be 
taken of a public or private corporation or a partner-
ship or association or governmental agency in accor-
dance with the provisions of Rule 30(b)(6). 
Within 30 days after the notice and written ques-
tions are served, a party may serve cross questions 
upon all other parties. Within 10 days after being 
served with cross questions, a party may serve redi-
rect questions upon all other parties. Within 10 days 
after being served with redirect questions, a party 
may serve recross questions upon all other parties. 
The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the 
time. 
(b) Officer to take responses and prepare 
record. A copy of the notice and copies of all ques-
tions served shall be delivered by the party taking 
the deposition to the officer designated in the notice, 
who shall proceed promptly, in the manner provided 
by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f). to take the testimony of the 
witness in response to the questions and to prepare, 
certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching 
thereto the copy of the notice and the questions re-
ceived by him. 
(c) Notice of filing. When the deposition is filed 
the party taking it shall promptly give notice thereof 
to all other parties. 
Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceed-
ings. 
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the 
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, 
any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the 
witness were then present and testifying, may be 
used against any party who was present or repre-
sented at the taking of the deposition or who had 
reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of 
the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party 
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching 
the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for 
any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who 
at the time of taking the deposition was an offi-
cer, director, or managing agent, or a person des-
ignated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a public or private corporation, partner-
ship or association or governmental agency 
which is a party may be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not 
a party, may be used by any party for any pur-
pose if the court finds: 
(A) that the witness is dead; or 
(B) that the witness is at a greater dis-
tance than 100 miles from the place of trial 
or hearing, or is out of the United States, 
unless it appears that the absence of the wit-
ness was procured by the party offering the 
deposition; or 
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or 
testify because of age. illness, infirmity, or 
imprisonment; or 
(D) that the party offering the deposition 
has been unable to procure the attendance of 
the witness by subpoena; or 
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In any action so certified to the district court, when 
any responsive pleading is required or permitted or a 
motion is allowed under these rules, the time in 
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be 
made shall commence to run from the time notice of 
the filing of the cause in the district court shall be 
served on the party making such responsive pleading 
or motion. 
Rule 14. Third-party practice. 
(a) When defendant may bring in third party. 
At any time after commencement of the action a de-
fendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sum-
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a 
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for 
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The 
third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
the service if he files the third-party complaint not 
later than ten days after he serves his original an-
swer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon 
notice to all parties to the action. The person served 
with the summons and third-party complaint, herein-
after called the third-party defendant, shall make his 
defenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as pro-
vided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the 
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other 
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The 
third-party defendant may assert against the plain-
tiffany defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to 
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may 
also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party 
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against 
the third-party defendant arising out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff, and 
the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his 
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-
party defendant may proceed under this rule against 
any person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the 
action against the third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, 
he may cause a third party to be brought in under 
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a 
defendant to do so. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his plead-
ing once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he 
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever pe-
riod may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supple-
mental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permis-
sion may be granted even though the original plead-
ing is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the ad-
verse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and 
management conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court 
in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct 
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented 
parties to appear before it for a conference or confer-
ences before trial for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control 
so that the case will not be protracted for lack of 
management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through 
more thorough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the 
orderly disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. 
In any action, in addition to any pretrial conferences 
that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion may 
direct that a scheduling or management conference 
be held. The court may direct the attorneys or unrep-
resented parties to appear before the court. Schedul-
ing or management conferences may also be held by 
way of telephone conferencing between the court and 
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions 
and agreements reached at scheduling and manage-
ment conferences may be formally made an order of 
the court. At the conference, the court may consider 
the following matters: 
(1) the formation and simplification of the is-
sues, including the elimination of frivolous 
claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining ad-
ditional parties or amendment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of 
fact and of documents which will avoid unneces-
sary proof, stipulations regarding the authentic-
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to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and 
does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a mo-
tion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all de-
fenses and objections which he does not present either 
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the 
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indis-
pensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, 
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by sugges-
tion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dis-
miss the action. The objection or defense, if made at 
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing 
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any mo-
tion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. 
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish secu-
rity for costs and charges which may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, 
the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required 
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the 
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order 
dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall 
state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time 
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication 
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state 
the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced 
the claim was the subject of another pending action, 
or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim 
by attachment or other process by which the court did 
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judg-
ment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any 
counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may 
state as a counterclaim any claim against an oppos-
ing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A 
counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the 
recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim 
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from 
that sought in the pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after 
pleading. A claim which either matured or was ac-
quired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a 
counterclaim by supplemental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails 
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadver-
tence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, 
he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading 
may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party 
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the 
original action or of a counterclaim therein or relat-
ing to any property that is the subject-matter of the 
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim 
that the party against whom it is asserted is or may 
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a 
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claim-
ant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When 
the presence of parties other than those to the origi-
nal action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as 
defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction 
of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counter-
claim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the 
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise dis-
posed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment 
or death. When cross demands have existed between 
persons under such circumstances that, if one had 
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim 
could have been set up, the two demands shall be 
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, 
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by 
the assignment or death of the other, except as pro-
vided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise 
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and as-
signments of accounts receivable, any claim, counter-
claim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted 
against an assignor at the time of or before notice of 
such assignment, may be asserted against his as-
signee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim 
of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. 
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party 
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court 
does not have the power to grant the relief sought 
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
action and certify the same and transmit all papers 
therein to the district court of the county in which 
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment 
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying 
the record on appeal from such court and for docket-
ing the same in the district court. The fees herein 
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk 
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so 
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse 
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim. 
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charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium 
in which the injured person is confined as a result of 
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable 
by the injured person, as provided in this act. 
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settle-
ment agreement, together with any payment or other 
consideration received in connection with this release 
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party 
to whom the release or settlement agreement was 
given, by the later of the following dates: 
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the oc-
currence causing the injuries which are subject of 
the settlement agreement or liability release; or 
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the in-
jured person's discharge from the hospital or san-
itarium in which this person has been confined 
continuously since the date of the occurrence 
causing the injury- 1973 
78-27-33. Statement of injured person — When 
inadmissible as evidence. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any state-
ment, either written or oral, obtained from an injured 
person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this 
person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a 
result of injuries sustained in the occurrence, and 
which statement is obtained by a person whose inter-
est is adverse or may become adverse to the injured 
person, except a law enforcement officer, shall not be 
admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding 
brought by or against the injured person for damages 
sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless: 
( l ) a written verbatim copy of the statement 
has been left with the injured party at the time 
the statement was taken; and 
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in 
writing within fifteen days of the date of the 
statement or within fifteen days after the date of 
the injured person's initial discharge from the 
hospital or sanitarium in which the person has 
been confined, whichever date is later. 1992 
78-27-34. Release, settlement or statement by in-
jured person — When rescission or dis-
avowal provisions inapplicable. 
This act shall not apply in the following circum-
stances: 
If at least five days prior to signing the settle-
ment agreement, liability release, or statement, 
the injured person has signed a statement in 
writing indicating his willingness that the settle-
ment agreement, liability release, or statement 
be given or signed. 1992 
78-27-35. Re lease , sett lement, or statement by 
injured person — Notice of resciss ion 
or disavowal. 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a state-
ment, if given by mail, is given when it is deposited in 
a mailbox, properly addressed with postage prepaid. 
Notice of cancellation given by the injured person 
need not take a particular form and is sufficient if it 
indicates by any form of written expression the inten-
tion of the injured person not to be bound by the set-
tlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed 
statement. 1973 
78-27-36. Right of resc iss ion or d i savowal of re-
lease , sett lement, or statement by in-
jured person in addit ion to other pro-
visions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights of rescis-
sion, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise exist-
ing in the law. 1973 
78-27-37. Definit ions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a 
person immune from suit as defined in Subsec-
tion (3), who is claimed to be liable because of 
fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of le-
gal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including negligence in 
all its degrees, contributor}' negligence, assump-
tion of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability, 
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under 
Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmen-
tal employee immune from suit pursuant to 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immu-
nity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any per-
son seeking damages or reimbursement on its 
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 1994 
78-27-38. Comparat ive negl igence . 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from 
any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, 
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, 
exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior 
to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 
78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 
78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault at-
tributable to each defendant, the fact finder may, 
and when requested by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the 
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is 
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the 
alleged injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune 
from suit is considered only to accurately deter-
mine the fault of the person seeking recovery and 
a defendant and may not subject the person im-
mune from suit to any liability, based on the allo-
cation of fault, in this or any other action. 1994 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total 
d a m a g e s and proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find sepa-
rate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, 
to each defendant, and to any person immune from 
suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit 
is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that 
percentage or proportion of fault to zero and real-
locate that percentage or proportion of fault to 
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] 1 If or it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it th 
2 height you think it deserves. If you should decide that the) 
3 opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficients 
4 education and experience, or if you should conclude that the 
5 [reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, orj 
6 that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may] 
7 (disregard the opinion entirely. 

















Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you, oin 
Iwill be shown to you, in order to help explain the facts 
disclosed by the books, records, and other documents which 
pre not in evidence in the case. However, such charts or 
summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof ofl 
any facts. If such charts or summaries do not correctly] 
reflect facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, 
|you should disregard them. 
Instruction No. 16: 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
fcircumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances) 
that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the) 
(facts sought to be proved. 
Instruction No. 17: 
Blanding City is subject to liability for physical hard 
baused to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at tha 
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1 Blanding City Dump if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knevj 
2 pf the dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable^ 
3 bare should have discovered the dangerous condition, and 
4 should have realized that the dangerous condition involved 
5 an unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and (b) should 
6 expect that Mel Laws will not discover or realize the danger] 
7 pr would fail to protect himself against it, and (c) 
8 Blanding City then failed to exercise reasonable care toj 
9 protect Melvin Laws from the dangerous condition-















Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent persorJ 
(uses in similar situations. The amount of care that is| 
considered reasonable depends on the situation. You must] 
pecide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would dd 
p.n a similar situation. Negligence may arise in acting or] 
{failing to act. 
Instruction No. 19: 
Approximate cause of an injury is that cause which inl 
[natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and 
Without which the injury would not have occurred 
approximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors] 
[that accomplish the injury. 
Instruction No. 20 
If you find that the defendant, that's Blanding City, 
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